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Abstract 
This paper applies Mundell' s criteria of Optimum Currency Areas to Iceland. The 
three criteria examined are: the openness oflceland with the European Monetary 
Union, the symmetry of shocks in Iceland and the European Monetary Union, and 
the wage flexibility and labor mobility of Iceland. In all three cases it is found that 
Iceland should be in the European Monetary Union. This paper then discusses 
three possible exchange rate arrangements for Iceland, which are keep their current 
exchange rate system, adopt the euro, and join the European Monetary Union. 
The conclusion for Iceland's exchange rate policy is to join the European 
Monetary Union. 
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Optimum Currency Areas: The Case of Iceland 
Optimum Currency Areas: The Case of Iceland. 
In the thirty years since the collapse of the Bretton-Woods international 
exchange rate system, many countries have shifted attention away from global 
monetary agreements and turned instead to the creation of regional fixed-exchange 
rate or single currency areas. On January 1, 1999, eleven of the fifteen members of 
the European Union (EU) launched their common currency, the euro, by pooling 
their national monetary units into a common monetary sovereignty. On January 1, 
2001, the EMU increased it size to twelve by adding Greece. It is hoped the 
common currency will contribute to growth and stability. This will be 
accomplished by the disappearance of exchange rate risk among participating 
countries, lower transaction costs in foreign trade, and the convergence of inflation 
and interest rates to the level in the most stable country. 
The use of a common currency also affects countries that trade with the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). Who should be in the currency area? Iceland 
is one of the many countries that has asked this question. How will the Euro affect 
Iceland? Should Iceland consider keeping their current exchange rate system, or 
should they implement another strategy? Is Iceland part of the Optimum Currency 
Area (OCA)? Relying on the framework developed by Robert Mundell, I will 
answer this question. Mundell (1961) considers three basic conditions that make a 
country more suited to join a currency area: 
1. The openness and integration of the country with the currency area. 
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2. The symmetry of shocks felt by the country and the OCA. 
3. The flexibility of the country's labor market in terms of wage flexibility 
and labor mobility. 
After detennining if Iceland is an Optimum Currency Area, I will review 
the present exchange rate policy and go through some possible alternatives for 
Iceland which are: (a) Keep their present exchange rate system, (b) Adopt the 
euro as legal tender without EMU membership, and finally ( c) Join the EMU. 
To begin my analysis, it is necessary to develop a brief overview of Iceland 
and the history of its exchange rate system to frame Iceland' s current 
circumstances, but first I would like to include my literature review and criticism of 
the OCA theory. 
Literature Review 
In 1961, Robert Mundell wrote "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas.,, 
His work in this field won the Nobel Prize for Economics in 1999. In his paper he 
defined optimum currency areas. Since Mundell' s first publication, there have 
been many papers written on the subject. R. McKinnon, in 1963, wrote "Optimum 
Currency Areas". McK.innon develops the idea of optimality to a greater degree 
by discussing the influence of the openness of the economy. Tavlas, in 1993, 
wrote ''The New Theory of Optimum Currency Areas." Tavlas focused on the 
costs of renouncing the exchange rate. 
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Despite the attention directed to the theory of OCA, there have been few 
papers written on Iceland and Optimum Currency Areas. One paper from the 
Central Bank oflceland was written by M. Guomundsson, T. Petursson, and A 
Sighvatsson, in 2000, titled, "Optimal Exchange Rate Policy: The Case of 
Iceland." In this paper the authors discuss the appropriate exchange rate system 
for Iceland and conclude that Iceland does not meet any of the OCA criteria~ thus 
Iceland should have a flexible exchange rate system. The authors state that their 
conclusion could change in the future depending on how much more Iceland 
becomes integrated with the EMU. 
W. Buiter, in 2000, wrote "Is Iceland an Optimal Currency Area." Buiter 
considers the pros and cons for Iceland adopting the euro as legal tender. He does 
not discuss any other alternatives for Iceland' s exchange rate system. Buiter finds 
the economic arguments favor a full membership in the EMU but does not favor a 
unilateral adoption of the euro without joining the EMU. He also goes into the 
political aspects of a monetary union for Iceland and finds the arguments for any 
form of monetary union are overwhelming. To understand the impact of Iceland' s 
participation in the EMU, requires a more detailed examination ofMundell's 
theory of Optimum Currency Areas. 
Criticism of OCA Theory 
Buiter (2000) states the following criticism of the OCA literature: 
The theory of optimal currency areas, ... , is one of the low points of post-
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World War II monetary economics. Its key failure is a chronic confusion 
between transitory nominal price rigidities and permanent real rigidities. 
The result is greatly overblown account of the power of monetary policy to 
affect real economic performance, for good or for bad. (p. l 0) 
Another study questioned the relevance of the OCA criteria for a 
successful monetary union. The Nordic Currency Union, which Iceland was a part 
of at the beginning of the 20th century, is considered to be one of the most 
successful in Europe's history. Bergman (1999) finds in his study that there was 
relatively little trade between the countries, mobility of labor was small, and shocks 
were not symmetric during this period. A criticism of this study would be that 
there was not as much international trade during the period late 1800s to early 
1900s. Another problem with this study is that Iceland was under the control of 
Denmark during this time and did not have any authority over monetary or foreign 
affairs. 
There are a few other problems with the OCA theory. One of these is that 
if the country does not fit the OCA criteria, it is considered to be a candidate for 
flexible exchange rate systems. It assumes that the country will use the flexible 
exchange rate system in a way to take full benefits of the system. However, 
Iceland is a perfect example of how a flexible exchange rate can be misused. When 
a country engages in frequent devaluations, they can lose their credibility. This 
could be as costly to the country in question as losing monetary independence in a 
monetary union. The OCA criteria should be taken as a guideline as to what kind 
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of exchange rate system a country should have, the country itself will have to see 
that it is used properly. 
Overview of Iceland 
After over a century of struggle for greater autonomy, the Union Treaty of 
1918 established Iceland as a free sovereign state in a personal union with the King 
of Denmark. It stated that either party could terminate the agreement after a 
period of twenty-five years. In 1940, about the time the treaty was up for 
reconsideration, the Germans occupied Denmark and effectively dissolved the 
union between Iceland and Denmark. World War II made it impossible for Iceland 
and Denmark to renegotiate their treaty. So, in 1944, Iceland decided to end the 
Union Treaty and gained full independence from Denmark. Since that time, 
Iceland's government has been a constitutional republic, and their government has 
peacefully transferred political power many times throughout 
the last half century. For the majority of the period since 1944, the economy has 
experienced economic growth and high inflation. 
Iceland's small homogenous population, of a quarter of a million people, is 
cohesive politically and economically. It has a highly unionized labor force, 
approximately 80 percent of the working population, and usually operates close to 
full employment. Labor is typically considered to be in short supply, with more 
than sixty percent of the labor employed in the service sector. 
Iceland is a very open economy, whose exports account for around two-
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fifths of their gross national product. Their exports are based heavily on fishing 
and the production of a variety of fish products. In fact, the fishing sector accounts 
for around eighty percent of total commodity exports. Iceland's primary 
manufactured export is aluminum but biotechnology and computer software 
exports are increasing. Iceland's main trading partners are part of the European 
Economic Area, which is around sixty percent of all exports and imports 
(International Monetary Fund, 1999, p 11). 
Iceland is well-integrated with international political and economic 
organizations, as a member to the United Nations, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
In summary, Iceland is an open economy dependent on natural resources 
for their exporting sector. This dependency has played an important role in 
Iceland's exchange rate policy overtime. 
History of Iceland's Exchange Rate System 
As can be seen from Table 1, Iceland's exchange rate system has gone 
through many changes throughout the twentieth century.1 At the beginning of the 
century, Iceland participated in a monetary union with Denmark. 
During World War I, Iceland had an inflation rate of 64%, mostly a result 
of leaving the gold standard, and when Great Britain returned to the gold standard 
1 
"Optimal Exchange Rate Policy: The Case oflceland," by M Guomundsson, T.G. Petursson, and A 
Sighvatsson, 2000, Central Bank of Iceland Reprinted or Adapted with permission. 
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in the twenties, Iceland did as well and linked the krona to the pound 
(Sigurjonsson, 1985, p52-53). This meant Iceland's currency, the krona, was now 
Table 1: History of Exchange Rate Systems in Iceland 
Period Type of Exchange Rate Regime 
187~1914 Nordic currency Union and on the gold standard. 
1914-1922 Off the gold standard in 1914, but maintained parity with Danish 
krone. 
1922-1925 A floating exchange rate regime is established, pound replaces krone 
as reference currency. 
1925-1939 Pound taken off gold standard in 1931, Icelandic krona continued to 
be linked to pound, Iceland began foreign exchange restrictions and 
protectionism. 
1939-1945 Krona devalued by 18% in 1939, krona now linked to U.S. dollar. 
Krona depreciated against the dollar but appreciated against the 
pound. Economy overtleabld, inflation high. 
1946-1949 1949 the pound was devalued by 30.5% against the dollar, and the 
krona followed the pound 
1950 More devaluations of the krona. 
1951-1959 Multiple exchange rates and ext:ensive export subsidies was 
established. 
1960-1970 Krona devalued by one-third in 1960, and extensive trade 
liberalization. Aexibility of the exchange rate enhanced. Krona 
devalued several times during this period. 
1970-1973 Brettoo-Woods system falls apart and dollar was devalued, krona 
broadly followed dollar, but krona devalued in 1972, and revalued 
twice in 1973 against the dollar, until krona was floated In December 
of 1973. 
1974-1989 Becomes increasingly more flexible, towards managed floating until 
the middle of the 1980s exchange rate policy becomes more 
restrictive. Krona devalued 25 times in this period. 
1990- Exchange rate has received stronger emphasis. Two devaluations 
during this period, both because of exti!mal shocks. 
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overvalued and there was a switch from domestic demand to a demand for 
imported goods. When a new political party took over in 1931 and Great Britain 
left the gold standard, there was a consensus for Iceland to leave the gold standard 
as well. 
The 1930s to 1950s were characterized by protectionist isolationism, due 
to a declining competitive position. In the 1930s, exchange restrictions and 
protectionism were adopted. After World War II, facing a continued decline in 
foreign trade balances, Iceland restricted foreign trade with multiple exchange rate 
systems, quantitative import restrictions, and export subsidies. 
Since economic conditions of Iceland did not improve by the early sixties a 
change in political parties took place. A more liberal form of international trade 
was established. Multiple exchange rates and quantitative restrictions were 
abolished. However, all the major banks and credit institutions remained in state 
hands (Sigurjonsson, 1985, p.56). 
There were two periods of floating exchange rates, where the relative value 
of currencies were free to fluctuate on the basis of the interplay of supply and 
demand. This was very different from the earlier fixed exchange rate system when 
a monetary authority fixed the value of currencies. The first floating exchange rate 
system occurred in 1922-1925 and the second after the Bretton-Woods system 
collapsed in 1973-1989 (Iceland became a member ofBretton-Woods in 1945). 
Except for these two periods, the krona has been fixed or pegged to another 
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currency or a basket of currencies. Since the Bretton-W oods system collapsed, 
exchange rate policy can be divided into two different periods: The first from 
1973-1989 and the second from 1990 to the present. 
Exchange Rate System 1973-1989 
From 1973 to 1989, the exchange rate system in Iceland had many 
adjustments. In fact the krona was devalued over twenty-five times during this 
period. Inflation was high throughout this period (see Table 2), but it can not be 
fully attributed to the devaluation policy by itself because a host of other problems 
that added to high inflation. These problems were adverse external shocks, a 
generally accommodating monetary stance, and a very tight tabor market (showing 
the full employment policy at the time). 
In Iceland during the 1970s, a definite process was followed. Iceland 
would be hit by a negative external shock (high oil prices and raw material prices 
for example), inflation would start to peak, and the krona would be devalued. The 
devaluations were used to keep employment high. However, the exchange rate 
was rarely revalued when a positive shock hit the economy. As shown in Table 2, 
inflation was the highest during the years 1980-1984, mostly because of poor fish 
catches and increases in oil prices. The average change in the general price was 
around forty percent for the time period. 
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Exchange Rate System 1990- present 
With all of these problems how could Iceland address the problem of 
inflation? In fact, Iceland has made a host of changes. In the first place there was 
a change in policy direction towards price stability. Rather than using the 
exchange rate as a means of adjustment, greater emphasis was put on a stable 
exchange rate as a monetary anchor. At the end of the 1980s, the government 
announced that it would adopt a fixed exchange rate defined in terms of a basket 
of currencies that would be allowed to fluctuate within a band. Presently, the euro 
is the most important currency in the basket. Since its adoption the krona was 
devalued twice, in 1992 and 1993 {IMF, 1997, p.6). 
The adoption of the euro-based monetary regime has not, however, 
stopped all reliance on devaluation. The first devaluation in 1992 was by six 
percent and in response to disorder in the European currency markets {IMF, p.6). 
The second devaluation in 1993 was around seven percent and was in response to 
a severe cut in fishing quotas and falling fish prices (IMF, p.6). 
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Table 2: Inflation during the period 1973·1989 
lac 1nt1ati2n Caitinm from prevjcHls Dlrl 
1973 24.7% 
1974 42.2% 
1975 50.2% 
1976 33.6% 
1977 30.5% 
1978 44.3% 
1979 45.7% 
1980 59.0% 
1981 50.6% 
1982 51.1% 
1983 85.7% 
1984 30.3% 
1985 32.7% 
1986 20.6% 
1987 18.9".ro 
1988 26.4% 
1989 22.3% 
Notes: Icelandic Historical Statistics, 1997, p. 637. 
The new regime of tight monetary policy and less reliance on devaluations has 
reduced the inflation rate significantly (see Table 3). 
Table 3: Inflation in Iceland 1991·1998 
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
CPI 6.8 3.7 4.1 1.5 1.7 2.3 1.8 1.7 
Inflation Clfo 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland. 
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Iceland's Present Economy 
Iceland's economy grew around five percent during the period 1996-1999, 
but the growth rate will fall in the year 2001. (Central Bank oflceland, 2000, p.4). 
In 1999, Iceland's per capita GDP was $31 ,000, and unemployment is still 
basically non-existent. (Central Bank oflceland, p. 3). The forecasted inflation 
rate for 2001 is around four percent (Central Bank of Iceland, p. 12). Iceland has 
had a decline in private consumption and negative export growth (in 1999 their 
exports were 34% and Imports were 38% of GDP), due to a reduction in their fish 
catch and because of rising oil prices. They are running a current account deficit. 
In 2000 the krona was based on a currency basket consisting of nine currencies 
with the euro constituting the biggest share of around thirty percent, the dollar 
around twenty-five percent, and the British pound around fifteen percent (Central 
Bank oflceland, p. 27). 
Summary 
Protectionism and devaluation were the first line of defense to deal with 
Iceland's exchange rate system and inflation problems. Since 1990 Iceland has 
worked on correcting these problems by adopting a fixed exchange rate system. 
Because of the apparent success of Iceland's shift to a fixed exchange rate system 
in the 1990s, the next question is: How fixed should Iceland make its exchange 
rate? Should Iceland more fully integrate with the European Union by adopting 
the EMU? To address this question, I will apply Mundell' s Theory of Optimum 
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Currency Areas (OCA) to Iceland and then discuss the options for their exchange 
rate system. 
Mundell's Theory on OCA (1961) 
According to Mundell ( 1961 ), an Optimum Currency Area exists when the 
costs of relinquishing the exchange rate as an internal instrument of adjustment are 
outweighed by the benefits of adopting a single currency or a fixed exchange rate 
regime. Mundell argues that integration of the economies, symmetry of shocks, 
and flexibility of labor in terms of mobility and wages are required for a nation to 
benefit from participation in an OCA. 
Integration is important in an OCA for two reasons. On the one hand, the 
flow of tradable goods can cause the overall price level to rise or fall in an open 
economy. Nominal wages are likely to be strongly connected to the exchange rate 
in open economies through import and export prices. An exchange rate 
devaluation will therefore have little effect on the real exchange rate since the 
effects of the devaluation will transmit quickly to the domestic price level and to 
nominal wages. On the other hand, a more open economy has higher transaction 
costs associated with international trade. Joining an OCA reduces the transaction 
costs for trading currencies (M. Guomundsson, T. Petursson, and A Sighvatsson, 
2000, p. 19). 
Symmetry is also a primary determinant of the OCA. When a country joins 
a currency union, monetary policy can no longer be applied in response to specific 
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shocks to the country. The risk of these kinds of shocks is larger for those 
countries whose economic cycle is less harmonized with the countries of the 
currency union. If a country is hit by supply shocks, a flexible exchange rate is a 
tool for adjusting domestic balance. 
Lastly, the more flexible wages and tabor demand are in the domestic 
economy, the more suited the country is to join the currency union. If the 
country' s labor force is mobile and wages are flexible, then the adjustment to 
exogenous shocks can take place through the reallocation oflabor instead of 
changes in the exchange rate. I will now relate these criteria to Iceland starting 
with the openness of the Icelandic economy. 
Degree of Openness in Iceland's Economy 
Iceland is a very small and open economy. How open is Iceland' s 
economy? I will answer this question with two different approaches. The first 
approach applies the degree of openness (0) for a country as explained by P. 
Davidson, 1992, p. 76-78. 
The degree of openness is found by the following equation: 
0 = [(M) I (C +I+ G)] * 100 
Where M = imports, C = consumption, I = investment, and G = government 
expenditures. 
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Table 4 lists the degree of openness for countries in the European Union, 
European Monetary Union, and the other main trading partners of Iceland for the 
year 1998. As shown, six of the fifteen EU countries have a higher degree of 
openness than Iceland. The average degree of openness for the EU is 36.3%, 
which is a little less than Iceland's 36.6%. When considering just the EMU 
countries, four out of twelve have a higher degree of openness, with a group 
average of 3 6. 6% which is about the same as Iceland's degree of openness. As for 
Iceland's other trading partners, only one country, Switzerland, has a higher 
degree of openness. 
Although Iceland is not an extremely open economy, it is open to a greater 
degree than most countries that are a part of the EU and EMU. 
The conclusion from the first approach is that Iceland fits the first criteria of 
Mundell's theory. 
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Table 4: Degree of Openness in the year 1998 
CountJy e 
European Union 
Austria* 35.0% 
Belgium* 60.0% 
Rnland* 33.6% 
France* 19.8% 
Germany* 24.7% 
Greece* 17.5% 
Ireland* 87.6% 
Italy* 17.7% 
Luxembourg* 58.0% 
Nether1ands* 43.0% 
Portugal* 22.6% 
Spain* 19.8% 
Denmark 38.0% 
Sweden 42.7% 
United Kingdom 24.9% 
other Countries 
Canada 29.8% 
Iceland 36.6% 
Japan 11.5% 
Norway 34.9% 
Russia 10.0% 
Switzerland 49.5% 
United Stat.es 10.4% 
Source: World Almanac 2001. Author's calculations. Note: *denotes European Monetary 
Union member countries. 
Taking into account Iceland's recent history, it is interesting to note, as you can 
see from table 5, Iceland's degree of openness has increased throughout the time 
period. 
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Iceland is not retreating from world trade but is actually becoming more integrated 
with other economies. 
Table 5: Openness in Iceland through the yean 1988-1999. 
Year 0, degree of openness 
1988 32.5% 
1989 33.0% 
1990 33.3% 
1991 32.5% 
1992 30.6% 
1993 30.8% 
1994 32.7% 
1995 33.JOA> 
1996 35.9% 
1997 35.6% 
1998 37.7% 
1999 36.8% 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland. Author's calculations. 
An additional test of Iceland' s integration with the EMU is to compare the 
percentage oflceland's exports and imports that go to the EMU and the EU. 
Table 6 lists the percentage of exports and imports of Iceland to the various 
countries. As shown, Iceland's main trading partners are part of the European 
Union, which enjoys 65.1 % in exports from Iceland and supplies 56.2% in imports. 
If just the European Monetary Union is considered, Iceland's import percentage is 
much lower at 32.7% and exports at 39.7%. The United Kingdom is Iceland's 
biggest trading partner, with one-fifth of their exports going to England. What 
does this mean in regards to Iceland joining the EMU? 
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Table 6: Distribution of Foreign Trade 
Country ~ of Imports ~of Exports 
European Union 
Austria* 0.6% 0.1% 
Belgium* 1.9% 1.3% 
Rnland* 1.6% 0.7% 
France* 3.6% 6.8% 
Germany* 11.5% 15.0% 
Greece 0.1% 0.5% 
Ireland* 1.5% 0.4% 
Italy* 3.2% 1.7% 
Luxembourg* 0.1% 0.3% 
Netherlands* 5.9% 4.1% 
Portugal* 0.7% 3.8% 
Spain* 2.0% 5.0% 
Tot.I EMU 32.7~ 39.7~ 
Denmar1< 7.7% 5.5% 
Sweden 6.JOA> 0.9% 
United Kingdom 9.7% 19.0% 
Tot.I EU 56.2~ 65.1~ 
Other Countries 
canada 0.8% 1.5% 
Japan 5.1% 4.8% 
Norway 9.2% 9.4% 
Russia 6.3% 2.8% 
Switzerland 1.5% 4.6% 
United States 11.1% 13.2% 
Tot.I Other 34.0~ 36.3~ 
Source: Central Bank of Iceland Note: Countries with • by them are in the European Monetary 
Union. 
The answer depends on who will eventually join the EMU. If the 
remaining three countries of the EU, Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
join the EMU, the economic impact will be much greater on Iceland, close to 
doubling the number of exports going to the EMU. While the scenario seems 
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likely in the case of Sweden and Denmark, the participation of the United 
Kingdom is much less plausible. 
In both measures of openness, Iceland' s degree of openness is above 
average when compared to other European countries. The conclusion is that 
Iceland fits the first criteria for Mundell' s theory. 
Symmetrv in Shocks 
Previous research on the causes of negative shocks to Iceland' s economy 
includes Magnusson and Einarsson (1985). They analyzed eight negative shocks 
during the period 1945-1985. They argue that six of the shocks can be attributed 
to changes in the price of and demand for Icelandic export goods abroad, while 
only two of the recessions are due to fluctuations in the fish catch. This study 
suggests that most of the negative shocks Iceland has experienced have not been 
supply shocks. 
Another study done in 1998, by Agnarsson, Hall, Herbertsson, Ingolfsson, 
Magnusson, and Zoega, titled "EMU and the Icelandic Labor Market," found 
fluctuations of the Icelandic economy more similar to those experienced by the 
United States and the United Kingdom individually, than to the EMU and EU 
countries. Agnarsson et al imply that Iceland is more closely integrated with the 
United States and the United Kingdom than to the EU and EMU as a whole. The 
degree of symmetry between Iceland, the EU, and the EMU, can be shown 
comparing the ratios of exports divided by GDP of each country over the period 
1967-1995 (see Appendix for data). After calculating each country' s ratio for 
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each year, an average is taken for the EU and the EMU. 
As you can see from Figure 1, Iceland's exports as percentage of GDP varies more 
than the EU and the EMU. While the EU and EMU exhibited a positive trend of 
exports to GDP, Iceland appears to fluctuate from a high of 45% in 1970, 
experiencing at best minimal growth of exports/GDP during this period. 
Figure 1: Symmetry of Shocks 
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Source: OECD 1996. Note: Author's calculations 
The first large peak for Iceland around the year 1968 is due to the collapse 
of the herring stock. Prices of Icelandic exports rose in foreign markets above 
previous years lows and the value of Icelandic exports increased in 1969 and 1970. 
The growth of 197 6-1978 was brought on by the extension of Iceland's exclusive 
fishing zone from 50 to 200 miles. The decline of 1981 was due to the oil crisis 
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2combined with two-years of bad fish catches. The other sharp down period in 
1988 was due to the adoption of government restrictions on the amount of fish 
caught. The late 1980s are when Iceland adopted their fixed exchange rate system, 
which contributed to a more stable export trade. It is interesting to note that 
Iceland's shocks have become more symmetric in 1980-1995 with the EU and the 
EMU, suggesting that Iceland is becoming more integrated with these countries. 
Iceland's past shocks have a low correlation with the EU and the EMU area, but 
correlation with these areas is presently increasing. A correlation analysis gave the 
following results: 
Table 7: Correlation Analysis 
Years ran for the Correlation Analysis CorTelation Coefficient 
1. Iceland and the EMU 1967-1995 .0855 
2. Iceland and the EU 1967-1995 .1047 
3. Iceland and the EMU 1967-1982 -.0599 
4. Iceland and the EU 1967-1982 -.1111 
5. Iceland and the EMU 1980-1995 .4441 
6. Iceland and the EU 1980-1995 .6390 
Note: Author's Calculations. All relationships were significant at the 1% level. 
The purpose of correlation analysis is to measure the degree to which two 
variables move together. The correlation coefficient is the number used to 
measure the strength of the relationship between the two variables. 2 The 
correlation analysis was computed for the overall period and then broken up into 
two sub-periods. The period was divided into two parts to show the increasing 
2 The correlatioE coefficie~ for variables j ~d k is 
rjk = (:E(xij - Xj)(xjk - xk) I [(.E(xij - Xj))2 (.E(xjk - ~))2t" 
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relationship of Iceland with the EU and EMU from 1980 to 1995. Looking at the 
results in table 7, Iceland has a positive but small relationship with the EU and 
EMU from 1967-1995. A negative relationship existed between Iceland, EU, and 
the EMU between the years 1967-1982. However, focusing on the later period 
1980-1995, the correlation of export fluctuation of Iceland with both the EU and 
EMU is positive and greatly increased (64% with EU and 36% with EMU) as 
shown in Table 7. When significance tests at the one-percent level were performed 
on all six of these correlation coefficients, the relationship in all of them was found 
to be statistically significant. 
Since there was not time to weight the individual countries, I included an 
analysis on the two biggest trading partners of Iceland. The two largest, in terms 
of the size of economy, are Iceland 's main trading partners Germany (EMU) and 
Great Britain (EU). United States was included for a comparison of the symmetry 
of Iceland's shocks with countries outside the EU. This is shown in figure 2 . 
When looking at Iceland, Germany and Great Britain, it appears that 
Iceland's shocks are more correlated with these two individual countries as 
compared to the EU and EMU as a whole. It also appears there is little if any 
symmetry between Iceland and the United States. Figure 2 shows Iceland is more 
symmetric with Germany and Great Britain from 1980-1995, suggesting that 
Iceland is becoming more integrated with these two countries. It is interesting to 
note that Iceland' s shocks are more symmetric with Germany than Great Britain, 
despite the fact the United Kingdom is its largest trading partner. This suggests 
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that Iceland' s shocks are more symmetric with the largest country in the EMU, 
rather than the largest in the EU. If Iceland follows more closely with the largest 
country in the EMU, then losing their monetary authority by joining the EMU will 
not be as great of a problem. 
Figure 2: Symmetry of Countries 
o~f--+-+--+--+--+--t-+---+--+---t-+---,f--+--+--+---t--+--f--+-+--+--+--__,1--+-+-__. 
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--0- Germany --*· United States 
Source: OECD statistics. Author's calculations. 
In conclusion, Iceland' s shocks from 1967-1995 do not correlate much 
with EU and the EMU. From 1980 to 1995, however, the degree of correlation 
increased substantially. This is particularly true after the adoption oflceland's 
fixed exchange rate system in 1989. Compliance with Mundell' s second criteria is 
not clearly met but great emphasis should be put on the fact that Iceland's shocks 
are increasingly symmetric with those of the EMU and the EU's shocks. 
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Wage Flexibility and Labor Mobility 
The last criteria that will be examined are wage flexibility and labor 
mobility. This will be broken up in two different parts. First, wage flexibility will 
be examined and then lab or mobility will be discussed. 
Recall that wage flexibility helps a country adjust when hit by exogenous 
shocks. Instead of using the exchange rate as a means of adjustment when hit by 
one of these shocks, a decrease or increase in the nominal wage can be used. For 
example, if Iceland entered a recession, a reduction in wages would allow the 
economy to recover without resorting to devaluation. Flexibility calls for nominal 
wages to be flexible both upward and downward. In Iceland's history since 1950, 
there has only been one decrease in the nominal wages, which was in 1959. This 
suggests nominal wages have not been downwardly flexible, as needed to fill OCA 
criteria. However, Guomundsson, Petursson, and Sighvatsson (2000) find that 
real wage flexibility has been great in Iceland. Table 8 compares real wage 
flexibility of many of the EU countries and reveals that Iceland had the highest real 
wage flexibility (7.7%) of all the countries4. This was measured as the ratio of 
standard deviation of real wage and output growth. 
4 
"Optimal Exchange Rate Policy: The Case oflceland," by M.Guomundsson, T. Petursson, and A 
Sighvatsson, 2000, Central Bank of Iceland Reprinted or Adapted with permission. 
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Table 8: Real Wage and Output growth 1981-1996 
Country A. Standard deviation B. Standard deviation ratio 
of Aln(w/p)t(%) of Alnyt(%) A/B 
Belgium 1.7 2.1 0.8 
Denmark 1.7 1.6 1.1 
Rnland 1.7 3.5 0.5 
France 1.8 1.4 1.3 
Germany 1.9 2.0 0.9 
Holland 1.6 1.6 1.0 
Iceland 7.7 3.0 2.6 
Italy 1.8 1.3 1.4 
Japan 1.3 1.8 0.7 
Norway 2.1 2.0 1.1 
Portugal 5.6 2.2 2.6 
Spain 1.4 1.9 0.7 
Sweden 2.4 1.9 1.3 
Switzerland 1.9 1.4 1.4 
UK 1.3 2.1 0.6 
USA 0.9 1.9 0.5 
Average 2.3 2.0 1.2 
Note: Aln(w/p}t(%) denotes real wage growth. Mnyt(%) denotes output growth. 
These findings suggest that Iceland would fit this part of the OCA criteria. 
However, the authors use the real wage, a measure which includes the price level 
and could alter the results. It is not apparent if nominal wages are flexible enough 
to minimize reliance on monetary policy when hit by major negative external 
shocks. What is apparent through this analysis is that if Iceland' s greater flexibility 
in wages is not sufficient, then neither are the other countries. This list included 
seven of the EMU countries, and ten of the EU countries. The reasonable 
conclusion is Iceland fits the third criteria. 
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The next part of the third criteria is that labor needs to be mobile, so when 
hit by exogenous shocks, tabor can reallocate to other industries to help lessen the 
severity of the shocks. Iceland is an isolated country with a homogenous 
population as stated earlier. During recessions, emigration to other Nordic 
countries occurred. However, Iceland is now a member of the European 
Economic Area (EEA), which means that Icelander's have the legal ability to freely 
move to all participating countries. 
Guomundsson, Petursson, and Sighvatsson (2000) estimated the effects of 
the business cycle on tabor mobility in Iceland. They used net emigration per 1 OOO 
inhabitants and regressed it on the past year's output growth during the period 
1962-1997. Their findings were that reductions in the previous year's output 
growth increased net emigration significantly. In fact, they found that a one-
percent reduction in output growth led to a net outflow of .03% of the population 
in the following year. In terms oflceland' s current population, (around 280,000), 
this means that around eighty-four people would leave the country after the shock 
had hit Iceland. 
The trouble with this analysis is what constitutes net outflow? It is not 
possible to know the reason people left. Was it because of the shock or for 
various other reasons? Although their results were significant, I question how 
eighty people relocating to other countries would be of much importance for the 
economy adjusting to an exogenous shock. 
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The evidence suggests that compliance with Mundell' s third criteria is 
inconclusive. Although Iceland has great flexibility in real wages, a more accurate 
test of nominal wages should be done. Iceland experienced labor emigration when 
hit by a negative shock. In future research on this issue, I would like to construct 
my own test for wage flexibility and labor mobility. This will be considered in more 
detail later. Now that I have examined how closely Iceland meets the three criteria 
for OCA, I will give some criticisms of the OCA literature and then begin 
discussing the appropriate exchange rate policy for Iceland. 
Exchange Rate Policy Options 
The results in this paper can be summarized as follows: 
1. Iceland is a candidate for a fixed exchange rate system and a member 
of the EMU according to the OCA criteria. 
2. Iceland presently has a stable exchange rate system with a fluctuation 
band allowing room for adjustment, which was very important to bring 
down the high inflation Iceland experienced up until the 1990s. 
3. The Icelandic economy has significant trading relationships with EMU 
countries, a connection that would be strengthened if the remaining EU 
countries joined the EMU. 
Now with these conclusions the options for Iceland' s exchange rate policy 
may be discussed. To refresh they are: keep their present exchange rate system, 
adopt the euro without EMU membership, or join the EMU. 
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Keep Present Exchange Rate System 
Iceland' s present exchange rate system is a fixed exchange rate system 
based on a basket of currencies, with the euro having the largest share of thirty 
percent, and a fluctuation band of nine percent. In the early 1990s, the fluctuation 
band was set at around two percent, and there were two devaluations of the krona 
in 1992 and 1993, due to minor external shocks. The present exchange rate 
system has done very well in bringing down the inflation rate in Iceland but has not 
been tested in the face of a major negative external shock. It is not clear then if 
their present policy would be sufficient. 
They can widen the fluctuation band to the point that their fixed exchange 
rate system is really flexible. Maintaining the status quo also depends on how well 
the exchange rate is managed. The problem with this system is deciding when and 
when not to adjust the exchange rate system. Iceland has had this problem in the 
past. Too frequent or excessive adjustments could weaken the credibility of a 
fixed exchange rate. 
Adopt the Euro 
Adoption of the euro without participating in the EMU is the second policy 
option. This option that has not usually been taken by relatively successful 
developed countries such as Iceland. 
There would be benefits to adopting the euro for Iceland. One of these 
benefits would be that transaction costs would be lessened. This would occur 
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because instead of using many different currencies, there would now be only one. 
There would also be a smaller exchange rate risk. The euro reduces uncertainty of 
the exchange rates and thus lower exchange risks. 
There would also be negative aspects to adopting the euro and not joining 
the EMU. One of these would be by not joining the EMU, Iceland would not by 
provided a share of the seigniorage revenues of the common currency area. 
Seignorage is a measure of resources appropriated by the state from non-interest-
bearing liabilities. Additionally Iceland would have no access to the discount 
window of the European Central Banlc (ECB), and the ECB would have no lender 
of last resort responsibilities to Iceland. 
Iceland would also not have a seat on the ECB Council or Executive 
Board, and the monetary policy by the ECB would not consider the economic 
conditions of Iceland when making decisions. Although there are advantages to 
adopting the euro, this does not seem like a good exchange rate system for Iceland 
because if Iceland joined the EMU all of the above problems would be solved. So, 
the most attractive exchange rate option for Iceland is membership in the EMU. 
Membership in the EMU 
With some qualification, Iceland fits all the criteria for OCA to join the 
European Monetary Union. Iceland is an open economy whose shocks are 
increasingly symmetric with the EMU. Iceland has great wage flexibility and 
significant tabor mobility. In comparison to existing options, the best exchange 
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rate policy option for Iceland would be to become a member of the EMU. To 
participate in the EMU they would have to join the European Union. 
There are three criteria that have to be met in order to join the EU. 
Politically the country must have stable institutions. These institutions must 
guarantee democracy, the rule oflaw, human rights, and respect for minorities. 
The country must have a functioning market economy. Also, the country must 
adhere to the various political, economic, and monetary aims of the EU 
(Ingebritsen, 1998, p.45). 
Iceland would fit the above criteria except for the common fisheries 
policy in the rules of the EU. This is the main reason Iceland has not joined the 
EU thus far. They are not ready to give up exclusive rights to their fishing zone. 
If they were to join, this would have to be negotiated. Iceland would also have to 
meet criteria such as minimizing the inflation rate. Currently the only condition not 
met by Iceland is their long-term nominal interest rates are too high 
(Guomundsson, 1999, p.4). In 1997, the EU convergence interest rate was 7.8 
and Iceland's was at 8.9. 
The benefits for Iceland joining the EMU would be great. The benefits 
would include transaction costs in foreign trade would be reduced, because there 
would be fewer currencies involved (the same benefits would accrue to travelers 
and investors). Secondly, the EMU will benefit from lower interest rates and costs 
of financial transactions due to bigger and deeper financial markets in the euro-
zone. 
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Finally, Iceland would benefit by the convergence of inflation and interest rates to 
the level of the most stable countries in the EMU. 
Certain risks are involved in the membership of the EMU. The main risk 
involved for Iceland would be loss of monetary policy. Upon joining the EMU, 
monetary policy could no longer be applied in response to country specific shocks 
(such as Iceland' s fish shocks). To reduce their dependence on fishing Iceland has 
attempted to diversify their economy over the recent past. They have an increasing 
service sector, with the majority of the people employed in this area. They have 
also increased their manufacture of aluminum and have been trying to expand new 
industries such as biotechnology and offshore banking. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
The work that I have done in this paper has been the best possible given 
time constraints. I have constructed different tests for the three OCA criteria. For 
the degree of openness, I measured the amount of Iceland's exports to the EMU 
and the EU. I also calculated the degree of openness for Iceland, EU, EMU, and 
other trading partners. 
For the calculations of symmetry of shocks between Iceland, EU, and 
EMU, I calculated the exports/GDP ratio over a period of years. In future work, 
I would weight each individual country according to their size in the EU and 
EMU. This problem was taken into consideration when I compared the largest 
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countries in the EU and EMU to Iceland, but weighting them would be a more 
correct way of calculating the ratios. 
In testing for wage flexibility, I used the test results of Guomundsson, 
Petursson, and Sighvatsson, (2000). Iftime had permitted, I would have liked to 
use a test for wage flexibility that used nominal wages instead of real wages. This 
would have taken out the price level that is included in real wages, and could 
change the results. 
Conclusion 
This paper has given a history of Iceland's exchange rate policies. It also 
discussed the many problems Iceland has had with inflation through the years and 
Iceland's devaluation policies of the 1970s and 1980s. Iceland' s fixed exchange 
rate system in the 1990s was analyzed and was found to be helpful in bringing 
down inflation in Iceland. 
With the emergence of the EMU many countries connected to the EMU, 
including Iceland, have had to reevaluate their current exchange rate systems. 
Iceland's current exchange rate system worked well in the 1990s, but will it 
continue to be appropriate with the EMU. Should Iceland be a participant in the 
EMU was analyzed using the OCA criteria developed by Mundell, and the results 
showed that Iceland should become a member. Iceland was found to be an above 
average open economy, and the shocks experienced by Iceland and the EMU have 
become more symmetric throughout the years. Also, Iceland has the wage 
36 
Optimum Currency Areas: The Case of Iceland 
flexibility and labor mobility needed to help adjust to shocks, without an 
independent monetary policy. When examining the three options discussed for 
Iceland's exchange rate policy, joining the EMU is the most appropriate for 
Iceland. They would get added benefits that would not be available by the other 
two options. 
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Apoendlxj 
Raw Data for Synmetry of Shocks 
Years 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 19n 1973 1974 
Countries 
Iceland 
exnorts 76.55 92.64 156.86 204.4 216.47 254.4 362.81 466.4 
GOP 2n.82 298.57 369.51 462.34 588.35 769.22 1037.89 1510.63 
exix>rts/GOP 27.55 31 .03 42.45 44.21 36.79 33.07 34.96 30.87 
Austria• 
elCllOltS 71520 78800 95020 116750 128640 146440 165890 204210 
GOP 285590 306830 335000 375680 419620 479540 543460 618500 
exporta/GOP 25.04 25.68 28.36 31.Cl6 30.66 30.54 30.52 33.01 
Belm*n. 
eXl>Olts 414200 465500 56H500 654500 698700 789100 975800 1260200 
GOP 955350 1022336 1134165 1262110 1382016 1545387 1755020 2056806 
exix>rtslGDP 43.36 45.53 49.52 51 .86 50.56 51.06 55.60 61 .27 
Flnlllnd" 
exDOrts 6176 8143 9905 11745 12226 14946 18153 24799 
GDP 31321 35906 40966 45743 50257 58625 71364 90055 
8)Q)Olt&IGDP 19.72 22.88 24.17 25.68 24.33 25.49 25.44 27.54 
fninc:e• 
mcports 75875 82652 100232 125428 145213 165138 196573 269637 
GDP 573306 623123 710501 793519 884186 987947 112S835 1302978 
amorta/GDP 13.23 13.26 14.11 15.81 16.42 16.72 17.58 20.89 
Oenn111w" 
mmorts 101010 113890 129460 143000 1sseoo 169780 200400 25Q960 
GOP 464350 533280 595950 675300 749750 823120 917250 D83930 
8KDOlt9/GDP 20.43 21.36 21 .69 21 .18 20.n 20.63 21 .85 26.42 
Greece" 
exDOlta 2168e 21188 2<t397 28249 32132 '41730 &4907 85498 
GDP 261e&S 283958 322647 361948 399949 457376 5862~ e83176 
mmorts/GOP 8.29 7.41:> 7.56 7 .80 8.03 9 .12 11.07 12.51 
Ireland" 
mx>rts 418.7 484.8 538.2 800.4 670.8 775.1 1029 1274.9 
GDP 1152 1299.8 1501 .4 1691 .3 1934.5 2335.7 2819.6 3118.7 
exDOrtatGDP 36.35 37.30 35.85 35.50 34.68 33.18 38.49 40.88 
lbN9 
exDOltS 7539 8611 9682 11093 12'413 14175 16830 24673 
GDP 49651 54035 59653 67133 73003 79750 96601 121968 
exoort.tGOP 15.12 15.94 16.57 16.52 17.00 17.77 17.42 20.23 
Lux-
elCl)Olts 31755 35630 43187 53306 53831 57080 74767 104721 
GDP <I0955 44809 51886 60734 61845 69742 84758 103327 
.. v""""*lr.DP 77.54 79.52 83.23 87.77 87.04 81.84 88.21 101.35 
Neitheriands. 
exoorts 34296 38472 45187 53457 61057 68322 82115 106106 
GOP 87227 96719 109536 122971 136486 166470 178583 202642 
tua>Ol1s/GDP 39.32 39.78 41.25 43.47 44.09 43.66 45.99 52.36 
9'CDOtts 37633 38301 41002 415541 52G 88307 79210 95732 
GOP 150720 166842 182983 203584 227976 26&468 323147 388499 
8lCllOl1s/GDP 24.97 22.96 22.41 22.37 23.00 24.98 24.51 24.64 
~· 
e!Q)C)lt8 167.7 234 287.3 348.3 421 .7 507.3 810.8 740.3 
GDP 1842.1 2079.7 2381.2 2629.8 2968 3483.3 4199.5 5142.7 
eoa>Orta/GDP 9.10 11 .25 12.07 13.24 14.21 14.56 14.54 14.40 
Detlr'Mrt 
ozn1a 'D076 25980 ~ 33103 36183 40635 49314 61482 
GDP 84813 94358 107319 118625 131119 150728 172861 193629 
miort:s/GOP 27.21 27.53 27.42 27.91 27.60 'ZT.00 28.53 31.75 
Sw.den 
""""""" 
1l!n57 30420 34993 41501 45301 49267 62112 8241!5 
GOP 134970 1'43227 155542 174180 186326 20e068 229314 259032 
........-JGDP 20.79 21.24 22.50 23.83 24.05 23.91 27.09 31.84 
United"'~~-
""""""' 
7715 9366 10461 11916 13356 14'021 17553 23442 
GDP 40302 43671 46997 51607 57583 64478 7~ 83711 
-GDP 19.14 21.45 22.26 23.09 23.19 21 .75 23.70 28.00 
EMU' 
-GDP 27.7 28.8 29.7 31 .2 30.9 30.8 32.4 382 
EU 
-GDP 26.8 27.5 28.6 29.8 29.7 29.5 31.2 35.0 
sourc:.: oeco statistics. Note countries wtlh • bY them •re 1n the EMU. 
Al countriH.,. included In the EU u.,...,. Iceland. PllQ838 
Appendllt (COft't-1 I ! 
I ! 
Years 1975 1976 19n 1978 1979 1980 1981 19821 1983 
COtlntl'leS I 
Iceland I 
e>aX>nS 705.68 1029.81 1417.64 2438.37 3743.03 8561 12468 26683 33765 
GDP 2156.94 3033.67 4381.05 8792.72 11035.97 25276 39582 68242 89i44 
ext>Orts/GDP 32.72 33.95 32.36 35.90 33.92 33.87 31 .49 39.10 37.88 
Austria* 
8llll0fts 209020 236292 256937 2&J757 327e88 366244 404512 431244 449686 
GDP 656110 7247~ 796191. 842334 918537 994704 1055972 1133535 1201217 
exixxtstGDP 31.86 32.60 32.27 33.33 35.67 36.82 38.31 38.04 37.44 
-ulm" 
eJCl)OrtS 1220100 1«i6900 1543700 1597400 1863900 2170200 2430000 2794300 3078900 
GDP 2271144 2578903 2785262 2987489 3188796 3451150 3579813 3890990 4127056 
9XPOrts/GDP 53.72 56.49 55.42 53.47 58.45 62.88 68.13 71.81 74.60 
Finland" 
ext>Olts 24758 29537 36974 43037 52546 63489 7Z357 75801 82735 
GDP 103174 116644 128545 142289 165550 191376 216660 243585 271607 
elCPOrt8/GDP 24.00 25.32 28.76 30.25 31.74 33.18 33.40 31.12 30.46 
France• 
exiiorts 27~ 332954 392889 445463 526941 604422 714282 790351 900658 
GOP 1467884 1700553 1917803 2182588 2481097 2806295 3164804 3626021 4006498 
BXDOl'ts/GOP 19.06 19.58 20.49 20.41 21 .24 21 .52 22.57 21 .80 22.48 
Gemwny" 
ecports 253500 287820 304550 318290 348190 389140 441120 474390 479630 
GDP 1026630 1120500 1195290 1283550 1388440 1472040 1534970 1588090 1568540 
8lCDOl1s/GOP 24.69 25.69 25.48 24.80 25.08 26.44 28.74 29.87 28.75 
Greece* 
elCPOrtS 10&n4 136714 152912 192507 235080 336905 397879 445580 574138 
GOP 813893 998882 11ee945 1406290 1730033 2071711 2482343 3117558 3728471 
lllCDOl'!s/GOP 13.12 13.69 13.10 13.69 13.59 16.26 16.03 14.29 15.40 
Ireland" 
ll)(l)(Xfs 1623 2157.8 2824 3382.2 3946.1 4650.2 5517.3 6449.3 7n0.9 
GOP 3958.5 4857.7 5953.9 7053.5 ~.5 9n1 .8 11857.7 13969.9 15428.2 
exDOrts/GOP 41 .00 44.42 47.43 47.95 47.75 47.59 46.53 46.17 50.37 
.....,.. 
exDOl1S 28552 38607 49864 59402 75027 84349 107649 124031 138895 
GDP 138590 174584 212707 251000 307823 385327 461061 542125 631610 
expottSIGDP 20.60 22.11 23.44 23.67 24.37 21.69 23.~ 22.68 21.99 
I . 
8lCllOlts 87399 95831 97062 102430 121007 128210 133768 153985 171750 
GDP 95710 110124 113164 123818 134774 1"6673 156341 175203 192744 
llXDOl1s/GOP 91 .32 87.02 85.77 82.73 89.79 87.41 85.56 87.89 89.11 
NldherUnds* 
exoorts 108016 126475 128710 131840 153240 174600 202680 206380 214680 
GOP 223112 255539 278870 300580 319940 341680 358200 373060 387350 
elCDOlts/GOP 48.41 411.49 46.15 43.86 47.90 51.10 56.58 55.86 55.42 
Port.....,. 
lllQ)Ol1$ 80809 85840 121086 166319 282213 361216 409068 513003 757448 
GDP 431922 636868 716620 901462 1137396 1438257 1718889 2118632 2635605 
~GDP 18.71 15.99 16.90 18.45 24.81 25.11 23.80 24.21 28.74 
snain• 
"""""" 
815.9 997 1334 1710.1 1975.2 2386.6 3041.9 3630.6 4666.9 
GOP 6038.3 7266.4 9220 11284.9 13201 .1 15188 17044.7 19722.6 22531.8 
8XllOlta/GOP 13.51 13.72 14.47 15.15 14.96 15.73 17.85 18.41 20.71 
Dwlmlrk 
8lalOlts 66049 n454 80463 86516 101444 122256 149042 1~ 186311 
GDP 216257 251214 279311 3113n 348893 373786 407790 464466 512541 
l!lCDOrtslGOP 30.08 26.64 28.81 27.78 29.24 32.71 36.55 36.37 36.35 
Sw.ct.n 
8XDOtts 84650 94041 101297 116359 140520 156469 174107 204756 253260 
GOP 304197 344056 374213 417127 467550 531054 581685 63e015 712310 
fllCDOfts/GOP Z7.83 27.33 27.07 27.90 30.06 29.46 29.93 32.19 35.55 
United KinnMrn 
""""""" 
27379 35676 43835 47949 55464 63lYJ7 f>7837 73184 80323 
GOP 1~ 124991 145657 168143 197826 231233 254273 278241 303519 
""""""'GDP 25.93 28.54 30.09 28.52 28.04 27.29 26.68 26.30 26.46 
EMU" 
elCDOrta/GOP 33.3 33.8 34.2 34.0 36.3 37.2 38.4 38.5 "40.3 
EU 
~GOP 32.3 32.7 33.0 32.8 34.8 35.7 36.9 37.1 42.9 
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I . (con') 
! I I I 
Year 1964 1985 1906 1987 Hl88 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Countries 
loeland 
exoorts 48n4 61961 71681 81721 106282 124246 124943 121248 134972 
GDP 120899 161217 209109 256840 308192 363915 396721 397833 410880 
"1mt'Vts/GOP 40.34 38.43 34.28 31.84 34.49 34.14 31.49 30.48 32.85 
Austria' 
.. """""' I 497645 549126 522970 527054 590659 869618 728312 n4708 791618 
GOP 1Z'!6775 1348425 1422G7 1'481388 1566439 1672900 1801309 192e533 2047249 
"1n'>tlfta/GOP 38.96 40.72 3&.76 35.58 37.71 40.03 40.43 40.21 38.67 
e.anuim• 
unarts 3505200 3644900 3522900 3608800 4028800 4629800 4733200 4854500 4980300 
GOP 4436641 47'45838 5035294 5256115 5612698 8071589 6474845 6780142 7142752 
e>mMs!GOP 79.01 76.80 69.96 68.66 71 .78 76.25 73.10 71 .80 69.73 
Finland" 
""""""" 
94190 90034 95634 100048 108750 116702 118828 109289 128272 
GDP 304597 331628 354994 386e65 434341 ~ 515430 490868 476778 
..,,,,.,,,..,GDP 30.92 29.56 26.94 25.86 25.04 23.96 23.05 22.26 26.90 
France• 
""""""- 1053328 1123930 1074095 1101383 1221304 1411087 1467972 1538062 1588103 
GDP 4361913 4700143 5069296 5336652 5735092 6159680 6509488 8778231 6999546 
......ort&IGOP 24.15 23.91 21 .19 20.64 21 .30 22.91 22.55 22.70 22.69 
Oennanv" 
8lmOrts 536320 5!¥Zl40 580540 578610 619630 701430 778900 888780 939670 
GOP 1750690 1623180 1925290 1990480 2095980 2224440 2426000 2647960 2813000 
axcorta/GDP 30.83 32.51 30.15 28.97 29.57 31 .53 32.11 33.56 33.40 
~· 
mmorts TI6813 920913 1161575 1447835 1696419 1962818 2209754 2620733 3112448 
GOP ~174 5691554 6677640 7594471 9169019 10695230 13143050 18230510 18678039 
lbDOl1s/GOP 16.86 16.47 17.39 19.06 18.50 18.20 16.81 16.15 16.fle 
lnllend" 
.vnnrta 9794.4 10765.2 10377.3 11855.1 13652.8 16159 16152.7 16958 18856.8 
GOP 17127.2 18571 .1 19702.8 21074.7 22936.9 25621 .3 27566.3 28786.5 30734.3 
tlilMnltalGOP 57.19 57.97 52.67 56.25 59.52 63.07 58.60 58.91 61 .36 
'•-
""""""' 
164061 184848 181067 191016 2<17495 238437 262664 271428 295515 
GDP 722811 610081 898829 962763 1090023 1191961 1310659 1427571 1502493 
emon&IGOP 22.70 22.62 20.14 19.44 19.04 20.00 20.04 19.01 19.67 
ii 
'~ 
eimortB 213316 242879 247217 249873 285531 326649 338444 360433 383659 
GDP 213889 226477 250749 256962 287910 327230 345738 372428 405688 
mmotl&IGOP 99.83 107.24 96.59 96.48 99.17 99.82 97.89 96.78 94.57 
~nets· 
..,,..,,.,. 242690 258730 221950 219260 2'40250 267670 279740 293Cl90 294660 
GOP 405700 ~ 437860 +40840 457680 ~ 516650 542570 566100 
..-nntt&JGOP 59.82 80.80 50.69 49.74 52.49 55.20 54.16 54.02 52.09 
·-
--'- 1101273 1381232 1540193 1897157 2262829 2835617 ~03 3394893 3493964 
GDP 3224185 4035138 5061635 5926313 6955462 8184696 9621111 11031729 12~42 
UPOlta/GDP 34.16 34.23 30.43 32.00 32.53 34.65 34.27 XJ.77 28.12 
s.n.1n• 
9XDOltS 5864.5 8407.2 6416.9 6995.8 7574.8 8150.4 8555.1 9409.4 10420.2 
GOP 25519.5 28200.9 32323.9 36144 40158.7 45044.1 50145.2 54927.3 59104.9 
8lCPOlts/GDP 22.98 22.72 19.85 19.36 18.86 18.09 17.06 17.13 17.63 
Dennwk 
8llJ)Ol18 2<17523 225566 213559 220084 238915 264909 283575 306006 309395 
GOP 5e5284 615072 886496 8999()6 732054 767251 799109 827868 856030 
8!m0fta/GOP 3&.71 36.67 32.04 31.44 32.64 34.53 35.49 36.~ 36.14 
SW9den 
unorta 289619 305866 311134 332449 359690 394467 -406831 404184 401586 
GDP 797333 aeeeo1 947263 1023602 1114502 1232602 1359879 1447327 1441723 
exporta/GOP 36.35 35.29 32.85 32.48 32.27 32.00 29.92 27.93 27.85 
"'**' 
"""""" 
92161 102518 96362 106948 107866 122169 133870 135006 142880 
GOP 324842 356172 383632 421891 469760 514241 549386 573909 597012 
..-...nop 28.37 28.78 25.64 25.35 22.~ 23.76 24,37 23.53 23.93 
EMll' 
8lCIXlrtafGOP 43.1 43.8 39.6 39.4 40.5 42.0 40.9 37.9 40.1 
EU 
-GOP 41.2 41 .8 37.7 37.4 38.2 39.6 38.7 36.8 38.0 
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Appendix 
& 
· (con't) 
Year 1993 1994 1995 
Countries 
tc.land 
emottll 156478 160019 160019 
GDP 434524 455416 455416 
exoorts!GDP 36.01 35.14 35.14 
AustN' 
-.otl£ 786507 835381 887100 
GDP 21240n 2262917 2352«>0 
exi>orts!GDP 37.03 36.92 37.71 
lllelaukn" 
e>CPOrts 5011700 5460600 5704000 
GDP 7316593 7678129 7935999 
elCPOl1s/G DP 68.50 71 .51 72.63 
Finlllnd" 
exi:>orts 159438 182530 207521 
GDP 482397 509924 545729 
txl>Ofta/GDP 33.05 35.80 38.03 
Fr__. 
eXl>Olts 1566368 1684130 1801823 
GDP 7r:tn~ 7389654 7674811 
exJ>O(t81GDP 21.99 22.79 23.48 
GennltlV' 
*"'>nrt& Q22660 1003550 1012555 
GDP 28<14100 2965900 2999520 
avrvvt.laOP 32.44 33.84 33.76 
~· 
4IXDOrts 3422695 3987618 4361000 
GDP 21106183 23755806 26486057 
~DP 16.22 16.79 16.47 
~ 
tlCDorls 21988.1 25109.6 29945 
GDP 33213.1 36051.3 40136.4 
eicDOlta/GDP 66.20 1!9.65 74.61 
..,,,. 
ellDOlta 355486 '400922 468326 
GDP 1550296 1638506 1770949 
~DP 22.93 24.47 27.57 
8XDOfts 413300 457242 469160 
GDP 444293 487671 511244 
~GDP 93.02 93.76 91.77 
Nldlef1lnds• 
"""""'- 2513180 313980 338260 
GDP 581"'60 612960 635010 
emn.tGDP 50.42 51 .22 53.27 
ftXDOlta 3688498 4323796 5024748 
GDP 13209500 14082597 15073187 
llXDOttBIGDP 27.91 30.70 33.34 
an.Jn< 
tlXDOl1JI 11840.8 14437.5 16509.5 
GDP 60934.3 64698.8 69778.9 
~GDP 19.43 22.31 23.66 
Demwt1t 
..nnrta 299887 324758 335099 
GDP 8741110 9'1J!l!lifT 910m 
emorts/GOP 34.28 34.97 34.52 
SW9den 
.......n. 473292 5577S7 873021 
GDP 1446212 1531102 1644983 
""""""-"GDP 32.73 36.43 40.91 
United~ 
~ 160864 177020 198600 
GDP 62!!835 665570 698199 
DllOIUIGDP 25.58 26.60 28.44 
EMU" l 
ecDOl1a/GDP 40.8 ~5 43.8 
EU 
~DP 38.8 40.6 42.0 
1i>w. 41 
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